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I.  Introduction 
 
This Article examines the market reaction to a series of legal events concerning the 
judicial interpretation of the  pari passu clause in sovereign debt instruments.
1 More 
generally, the Article provides insights into the reactions of investors (predominantly 
financial institutions),  issuers (sovereigns), and those who draft  bond  covenants 
(lawyers), to unanticipated changes in the judicial interpretation of certain covenant 
terms.     
The first event – the initial shock – occurred in September of 2000, when a Brussels 
court, ruling in Elliott v. Peru
2 (“Elliott”), granted the hedge fund Elliott Associates 
(“Elliott”) an injunction against Peru, prohibiting it from paying its favored creditors 
unless pro rata payments were made to all the creditors who ranked pari passu according 
to the terms of their contracts.
3  Concerned that the injunction would force it to default on 
                                                     
1  The term  pari passu is from Latin and means “in equal step.”  Pari passu terms are ubiquitous in 
sovereign debt issuances and more generally in cross border transactions.  See Lee C. Buchheit & Jeremiah 
Pam, The Pari Passu Clause in Sovereign Debt Instruments, 53 Emory L. J. 869, 871  (2004).  Buchheit 
and Pam, two practicing lawyers in the sovereign debt field,explain at the outset of their article:  
Here is a typical formulation of the pari passu clause in a modern cross-border credit instrument: 
The Notes rank, and will rank, pari passu in right of payment with all other present and future 
unsecured and unsubordinated External Indebtedness of the Issuer. 
The Latin phrase pari passu means “in equal step” or just “equally.” The phrase pari passu was often 
used in equity jurisprudence to express the ratable interest of parties in the disposition of equitable 
assets. As explained by an English commentator in 1900: 
There is no special virtue in the words “pari passu,” “equally” would have the same effect, or any 
other words showing that the [debt instruments] were intended to stand on the same level footing 
without preference or priority among themselves, but the words pari passu are adopted as a 
general term well recognized in the administration of assets in courts of equity. 
Id. (internal citations omitted). 
In our dataset of over 300 issuances, every offering document contained a pari passu clause.  Further, as if 
to indicate its great importance, a version of the pari passu clause often showed up on the cover page of the 
offering document and most of the time was one of the terms described in the “summary of key terms” 
section at the front of the offering document.  See also Stephen Choi & Mitu Gulati, Contract as Statute, 
104 Mich. L. Rev. 1129, 1134 & n.12 (2006). 
2 Elliott Associates No. 2000QR92 (Court of Appeals of Brussels, 8
th Chamber, September 26, 2000). 
3 The “favored” creditors at the time were the holders of Peru’s Brady bonds.  These were the creditors who 
had entered into a restructuring agreement with Peru and taken the Brady instruments in exchange for their 
old bonds.  Only a handful of creditors did not enter the exchange.  Elliott was holding some of the paper 
that was not submitted in that exchange.  We are unaware of whether there were other creditors who also   3 
its obligations, Peru settled with the holdouts for $55 million, a tidy profit in view of the 
fact that it had earlier purchased the bonds for approximately $11 million.
4 
Elliott was the first instance in which a court had enforced a pari passu clause in a 
sovereign debt instrument, even though such clauses have been a staple of the boilerplate 
of sovereign debt issues for  about a century.
5  T he decision  had the potential for 
disrupting the international flow of funds.  Prior to Elliott, international creditors facing a 
defaulting sovereign debtor had no legally enforceable options for gaining bargaining 
power vis-à-vis the debtor or rival holders.  Elliott changed this.
6 Prior to Elliott, the pari 
passu clause seemed largely meaningless and, hence, harmless in the context of sovereign 
debt instruments. Outside the sovereign debt offering, the pari passu clause bars non-
proportional payments among creditors in the liquidation of the debtor’s estate.  Since 
sovereigns cannot liquidate, it was unclear to even the leading commentators at the time 
what the function of the pari passu clause was in the sovereign context.
7  Now, in the 
wake of  Elliott, there was the threat of hedge funds aggressively policing contract 
                                                                                                                                                            
held out and benefited from Elliott’s victory.  There have been no news reports indicating that there were 
others.  
4 For descriptions of the case and the furor it caused, see, e.g., Felix Salmon, Pari Passu Clause is Threat to 
Markets, Euromoney, May 2004 at 148; Charles G. Berry, ‘Pari Passu’ Means What Now?  N.Y. L. J. 
March 6, 2006; William W. Bratton, Pari Passu and a Distressed Sovereign’s Choices, 53 Emory L. J. 823 
(2004).  
5 For example, the U.K used a version of the clause closely resembling the modern version in its April 16, 
1902 issuance of debt (16,000 consols) through the Bank of England. Documents on File at the Morgan 
Library, New York.    
6 There is a good deal of evidence of market participants characterizing Elliott Associates as both 
unexpected and seismic. See e.g., Farisa Zarin, How to Sue a Sovereign: The Case of Peru, Moody’s 
Investors Service, Special Comment, November 2000 (Moody’s analyst observing “it turns [the investor’s] 
suit from an academic and avenging ‘I told you so’ option to a more lethal weapon”); Eric Lindenbaum & 
Alicia Duram, Debt Restructurings: Legal Considerations (Impact of Peru’s Legal Battle), Merrill Lynch 
Investor  Report, Oct. 30, 2000) (“Elliott Associates’ successful litigation against Peru . . . importantly set a 
precedent for the attachment of bond coupons. This could increase the incentive to hold out in debt 
restructurings.”). 
7 See PHILIP R. WOOD, PROJECT FINANCE, SUBORDINATED DEBT AND STATE LOANS 165 (1995); Lee C. 
Buchheit, Sub Specie Aeternitis, Int’l Fin. L. Rev., Dec. 1991 at 11-12.   4 
language and making innovative arguments about the meaning of ambiguous clauses.
8 
This occurred because  Elliott gave the  pari passu clause legal significance by 
empowering creditors to invoke the clause as a means for holding up the sovereign’s 
restructuring of its debt.  This was a bargaining chip that heretofore was not possessed by 
the holders of sovereign debt. 
  Elliott caused consternation among government officials and bond market 
participants. As later argued by the U.S. Treasury, the N.Y. Federal Reserve, and the 
New York Clearing House
9, the widespread acceptance of the interpretation of the pari 
passu clause provided by the Brussels court (the “rateable payments” interpretation) 
would not only exacerbate the classic holdout problem associated with debt, but would 
wreak havoc with the international flow of funds between countries and their creditors.  
The rateable payments interpretation would require sovereigns to pay all their creditors 
on a pro rata basis if it decided to pay  any creditor anything.  At the  very least, the 
country would have to stand ready to pay off all of its creditors on a pro rata basis if the 
creditors so desired.  Since a debtor nation could be required to pay all creditors if it 
attempted to pay any one, pari passu clauses give every creditor significant power over 
the sovereign’s ability to deal with its creditors on a one-to-one basis.   
                                                     
8 A similar paradigm shift has been observed in the corporate bond areas (where also Elliott has been one of 
the players).  See Marcel Kahan & Ed Rock, Hedge Funds and the Enforcement of Bondholder Rights 
(draft dated Jan, 2008, on file with authors). 
9 The New York Clearing House is an association of the some of the largest commercial banks in the U.S. 
including the Bank of America, Citibank and HSBC.  For details, see  
http://www.theclearinghouse.org/about/board/000215f.php.  The filing of an amicus brief disagreeing with 
Elliott’s rateable payments interpretation was potentially important in terms of showing a judge th at it was 
not just the sovereign debtors who thought that Elliott’s interpretation was destructive, but also all the 
major creditors.  Senior lawyers at Sullivan & Cromwell, the law firm that does the largest share of work 
for underwriters doing sovereign issuances, were the authors of the brief for the Clearing House.  Brief in 
Macrotecnic Int’l Corp. v. Republic of Argentina (1/12/04) available at 
http://www.theclearinghouse.org/reference/amicus_curiae/index.php   
   5 
The ability of any one bondholder to hold up an efficient reorganization of the debt of 
sovereign issuers injected new risk into these securities.  The net effect of enforcing such 
clauses would be to preclude efficient reorganizations and render repayment more risky 
because of the reluctance of the debtor to repay anyone unless it was prepared to pay 
everyone.  Presumably, the impediments to efficient reorganizations and the ability of 
certain bondholders to extract rents from either sovereigns or other bondholders would be 
priced by capital market participants, resulting in a higher required rate of return on 
sovereign debt.  This, in part, is what we seek to determine in this study. 
  In an attempt to reduce the uncertainties created by Elliott, sovereigns began to 
adopt a particular type of contractual provision called Collective Action Clauses or  
CACs.
 10   The vast majority of sovereign debt is held by institutions and other large 
investors around the world.  The prior norm in the New York market had been that the 
payment terms of a bond could only be modified with unanimous approval of the holders 
of that issue.  As a result, each bondholder held a potential veto over any restructuring 
attempt.  This potential veto inherently invites holdouts similar to the strategy 
successfully employed by  Elliott.  At the time, the U.S. government perceived the 
inclusion of CACs in sovereign debt instruments to be an antidote to the problems created 
by the Elliott decision.  Most CACs replace the unanimity rule with a requirement that 
only 75% of the holders in principal amount are required to modify the terms of a debt 
                                                     
10  A CAC is a covenant written into a  bond contract that allows a pre-specified fraction of the firm’s 
bondholders to alter the payment terms of the contract (principal, interest, and dates of payment); without a 
CAC, any change in the terms of the indenture agreement must be approved by  all of t he firm’s 
bondholders.  Thus, the effect of a CAC is to reduce the holdout problem associated with a unanimity rule 
and should therefore reduce the spread on sovereign debt.  See Anna Gelpern & Mitu Gulati, Public Symbol 
in Private Contract: A Case Study 84 Wash. U. L. Q. 1627 (2006).   6 
contract.  By dropping the required approval percentage from 100% to 75%, CACs 
reduce somewhat the opportunity for holdouts to disrupt bond restructurings. 
Note, however, that  CACs do not directly get at the specific holdout  litigation 
problem posed by Elliott’s rateable payments argument.  Elliott in fact creates an ex post 
problem since its ill-effects occur after a restructuring has begun.  CACs instead work to 
protect against the holdout problem in the restructuring itself in that a single bondholder 
can no longer hold up a restructuring agreement; with CACs,  more than 25% of the 
holders in principal amount are needed to veto a restructuring.  The two problems are 
related though in that the holdout litigation problem can only occur if a bondholder can 
avoid being forced into the restructuring.  A more significant problem with the CAC 
“solution” is that the typical CAC applies to only to a single bond issue.  A creditor 
wanting to hold out could still do so by buying bonds from a prior issue by the sovereign 
that did not contain CACs, refusing to enter the restructuring, and invoking the pari passu 
clause once the post-restructuring payments had begun.  For the CAC solution to work 
effectively, sovereigns would have had to go beyond incorporating CACs into their new 
bonds, as Mexico did in February 2003.  They would also have to do an exchange of all 
their outstanding non CAC bonds for new CAC bonds, thus ameliorating the threat posed 
by the rateable payments argument.  Sovereigns though were simply not willing to pursue 
this course of action, suggesting therefore that  including CACs in sovereign debt 
agreements might not have been the antidote it was anticipated to be, if an antidote at 
all.
11 
                                                     
11 See William W. Bratton & Mitu Gulati, Sovereign Debt Reform and the Best Interest of Creditors, 57 
Vand. L. Rev. 1 (2004).    7 
CACs suddenly appeared in sovereign debt contracts in early 2003.  CACs were 
largely unheard of in the U.S. market before 2003, although they had long been used in 
sovereign bonds issued in the U.K. market.  Between 2001 and 2003, the U.S. Treasury, 
under the stewardship of Undersecretary John Taylor, mounted a campaign to persuade 
players in the U.S. sovereign debt market to adopt CACs as an antidote to the holdout 
problem exemplified by cases such as  Elliott.
12  Beginning in February 2003 with 
Mexico’s adoption of these clauses, sovereigns quickly began adopting CACs – even 
though practitioners continued to express skepticism as to whether the adoption of these 
clauses provided a meaningful solution to the holdout problem (it was, some said, a 
means of appeasing the U.S. government).
13  We offer empirical evidence of the market’s 
assessment of whether CACs impact the riskiness of bonds. 
Available data demonstrate the success the U.S. government had with its campaign to 
encourage the adoption of CACs: among 181 observations before 2003, only 7 (4%) 
contained a CAC; of the 129 observations after 2003, 111 (86%) included a CAC. (See 
Table 1 and Figure 1.)  The adoption of CACs was explicitly intended as a response to 
the holdout creditor threat exemplified and amplified by Elliott.
14  Thus Elliott arguably 
stimulated the wide adoption of a perceived contract solution (antidote), CACs, to the 
holdout problem. 
  A second potential antidote to the uncertainties created by  Elliott occurred in 
January of 2004 when the U.S. government announced its position  repudiating the 
                                                     
12 See Minn. Fed. Interview With John Taylor, June 06, 2006  (available at 
http://economistsview.typepad.com/economistsview/2006/06/minneapolis_fed.html) (attributing the drop in 
spreads that occurred at least partially to the adoption of CACs); see also JOHN TAYLOR, GLOBAL 
FINANCIAL WARRIORS 129-30 (2008) (characterizing 2003 as the “Year of the Clauses” and one of the big 
successes of the George Bush Appointed Treasury Team).   
13 See Gelpern & Gulati, supra note 10. 
14 Id.    8 
wisdom of that decision through amicus briefs filed in on-going litigation in New York 
involving debt issued by Argentina.
15  In these briefs, the U.S. Department of Justice 
(writing upon the advice of the Treasury Department) and the New York Federal Reserve 
argued against the rateable payments interpretation of pari passu clauses, reasoning that 
such a construction would exacerbate the holdout problem whenever a sovereign sought 
to re-negotiate its debt.
16  In light of the fact that the U.S. government rarely intervenes in 
sovereign debt disputes, and that courts are reputed to take the U.S. Government’s views 
seriously when it does, the filings of the briefs constituted major events.
17  Adding to this, 
in response to new litigation over the  pari passu clause in Brussels, the Belgian 
legislature passed legislation in December 2004 that made it harder for the holdouts to 
employ the strategy used in Elliott.
18 
                                                     
15 Statement of Interest of the United States, 5-6 (Jan. 12, 2004), in Macrotecnic, available at 
http://www.emta.org/members/US_Statement_of_Interest.pdf; Memorandum of Law of Amicus Curiae, 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 5-6, (Jan. 12, 2004), in Macrotecnic, available at: 
http://www.emta.org/members/New_York_Fed_Amicus_Brief.pdf. (stating that the adoption of the wide 
interpretation of the pari passu clause “would allow holdout creditors to disrupt the efficient operation of 
payment and settlement systems, create legal uncertainty for those systems, and ultimately cause adverse 
economic implications for beyond the sovereign debt dispute”).  
16 As noted earlier, the New York Clearing House that represents the largest commercial banks, also filed a 
brief in the case, taking the same position as the U.S. government.  See New York Clearing House Amicus 
Curiae Brief filed in Macrotecnic, January 13, 2004 (available at http://www.emta.org/ndevelop/ifa.htm)..  
Elliott also sparked a flurry of concern at the IMF.  The IMF focused on the implications of the Brussels’ 
court decision for the creditors of countries that default on their debt.  The result of this concern was a 
formal proposal to for an international bankruptcy court, which would among other things, have the power 
to reform contract terms and grant stays on litigation – similar to the stay associated with Chapter 11 in the 
U.S.  The purpose, in light of Elliott, was to give defaulting countries the time to work out their finances in 
an orderly fashion and, presumably, to insure that pari passu clauses and other provisions were properly 
enforced.  See Sean Hagan, Designing a Legal Framework to Restructure Sovereign Debt, 36 Geo, J, Int’l 
L. 299 (2005). 
17 Domestic U.S. courts are generally seen as giving the highest levels of deference to the U.S. 
government’s views in cases involving foreign affairs.  See William N. Eskridge Jr., & Lauren E. Baer, The 
Supreme Court’s Deference Continuum: An Empirical Analysis (from Chevron to Hamdan) (March 2008 
draft, on file with authors).  Cf. Hal S. Scott, Sovereign Debt Default:  Cry For the United States, Not for 
Argentina, Washington Legal Foundation, Working Paper Series No. 140, September 2006 (describing 
Elliott as the “high water mark for creditors rights” and criticizing the U.S. government for stepping in and 
curtailing those rights).      
18 For discussion, see National Bank of Belgium, Financial Stability Review 2005 at 162-63 (available at 
http://www.bnb.be/doc/ts/Publications/FSR/FSR_2005_EN.pdf); Vladmir Werning,  Argentina Debt 
Restructuring: Belgian Legal Reform Limits the Options for Hold Outs, J.P. Morgan Emerging Markets   9 
  The amicus briefs filed on behalf of the defendant in the New York litigation, 
combined with the actions of the Belgian legislature, presumably sent a signal to 
participants in the sovereign debt market that the Official Sector (the G-8 governments, 
their Finance ministries, and the major international financial organizations) disfavored 
the rateable payments interpretation of the pari passu clause.  The 2004 governmental 
responses were likely to impact any court faced with a holdout creditor raising the 
rateable payments argument.
19  In other words, after 2004, one might expect that 
countries could feel safer dealing with one creditor at a time without having to deal with 
all creditors pro ratably due to a pari passu clause.  Pursuant to this view, we conjecture 
that after 2004 sovereign debt became less risky and the market more liquid, which 
presumably increased the value of sovereign debt and reduce the required rate of return 
demanded by investors. Subsequently, we examine whether these actions impacted the 
required return on sovereign debt offerings. 
   The primary question that this Article asks is whether traders in the sovereign 
debt market acted in a predictable fashion in response to these regime shifts in the legal 
interpretation of pari passu clauses.  An ancillary question is the extent to which the legal 
counsel of sovereign debt issuers felt compelled to re-write the language in pari passu 
clauses in order to reduce the uncertainties injected by Elliott. 
Assuming that capital market agents incorporate the implications of important events 
into the pricing of securities, we ask whether the market considered these legal events 
                                                                                                                                                            
Research Bulletin, February 24, 2005 (reporting on the view that the Belgian legislation had reduced the 
litigation risks posed by holdouts such as Elliott).   
19 In early 2005, an eminent group of English lawyers added its view to the general position disfavoring the 
rateable payments interpretation.  Although put together by the Bank of England, this expert report was not 
an official statement of the U.K. government.  Nevertheless, it likely served to give sovereigns additional 
confidence that the weight of authority was against the rateable payments interpretation.  See FINANCIAL 
MARKETS  LAW  COMMITTEE, I SSUE  79—PARI  PASSU  CLAUSES (2005) (hereinafter ” FMLC Report”), 
available at http://www.fmlc.org/papers/fmlc79mar_2005.pdf.      10
significant.  That is, did prices move accordingly?  Specifically, we inquire whether the 
markets perceived a significant increase in the risk of holdout litigation subsequent to 
Elliott (the shock) and did they subsequently perceive that the move to CACs, the filing 
of briefs by the Official Sector and the passage of legislation in Belgium, provided 
antidotes to the holdout problem exacerbated by Elliott?   
In the sovereign debt literature, there is speculation in both directions.  Some have 
suggested that the risk of holdout litigation was never significant.
20  Perhaps the holdout 
risk was exaggerated by those in the Official Sector to serve political and bureaucratic 
goals such as the creation of a new International Bankruptcy Court under the auspices of 
the IMF (the “Cynical Story”)?  A recent study of sovereign debt market participants 
reports a number of the players as saying that the Official Sector had been galvanized to 
solve a holdout problem that was minimal at best.
21   
Alternatively, the Official Sector version of the story (the “Official Story”), 
contends that the holdout risk, particularly in the wake of  Elliott, was significant and 
raised the costs of default.
22  Not surprisingly, the Official Story goes on to claim that the 
holdout antidote that it pushed most aggressively, CACs, ameliorated the risk of holdouts 
and importantly, for our purposes, reduced the required returns to sovereign debt.
23  Even 
                                                     
20 E.g. Nouriel Roubini, Mechanisms for Dealing with Financial Crises, 126-27, in, FIXING FINANCIAL 
CRISES IN THE 21
ST CENTURY (ANDREW HALDANE EDS. 2004) (giving ten reasons why the holdout problem 
in sovereign debt was not nearly as significant as many have suggested in recent years). 
21 One player observed, “[s]uing a sovereign is so damn hard – being a holdout is hard, not smart . . . [T]he 
official sector was offended by what happened to Peru – someone bought low and shook down Peru . . . It 
offended [their] sense of fairness in the financial system.  Gelpern & Gulati, supra note 10 at 1693.  
22 This view was articulated by Stanley Fisher in his Lionel Robbins Lectures on the International Financial 
System, where he asserted that “Rightly or wrongly, debtor governments see the costs of default as 
extremely large – and recent legal developments, including the Elliott Associates case in the Peruvian debt 
restructuring, have raised the likely costs.”  See Manmohan S. Kumar & Marcus Miller, Evolution of the 
New Architecture,  351, in  INTERNATIONAL  FINANCIAL  GOVERNANCE UNDER  STRESS ( G EOFFREY  R.D. 
UNDERHILL  & X IAOKE  LIANG, eds. 2003) (quoting Fisher’s lecture and also articulating the view of 
increase litigation risks as a result of holdout creditors).   
23  See Minn. Fed Interview, supra note 12   11
within the context of the Official Story though, there is the question of which of the 
different strategies undertaken by the Official Sector  – the narrower anti-litigation 
defense strategy that involved the filing of amicus briefs and the passage of legislation or 
the broader contractual reform strategy that involved persuading private parties to reform 
their contract provisions – worked best to ameliorate the holdout threat that had arguably 
been elevated from minor nuisance to major crisis by Elliott.
24  To date, there has been no 
empirical inquiry into this question.
25 
To foreshadow the formal presentation of the results of our empirical analyses, we 
find that the average spread on sovereign debt – defined as the difference between the 
yield-to-maturity on a bond when issued and the yield-to-maturity of a U.S. Treasury 
Bond with the closest time to maturity – increased significantly in the wake of Elliott and 
decreased significantly after the New York litigation (the filing of the amicus briefs) and 
Belgian legislation.  However, we find that CACs, an innovation in contract language 
advocated by the U.S. Treasury to ameliorate the holdout problem, did not help to reduce 
spreads.  In other words, the portion of the Official Sector strategy that focused directly 
on litigation to negate the pari passu argument worked to reduce the required return on 
sovereign debt.   But the broader strategy of the U.S. government of promoting a contract 
clause that ameliorated holdout problems, CACs, had  no impact on the pricing of 
sovereign debt.    
Our results help answer the question of whether pricing in the sovereign bond market 
is sensitive to litigation and contractual reform events.  The empirical studies on the 
                                                     
24 See FEDERICO STURZENEGGER  & JEROMIN ZETTELMEYER, DEBT DEFAULTS AND LESSONS FROM A 
DECADE OF CRISES, Part I, Chapter 3 (2007). 
25 The treatment that comes closest to analyzing this question looks at a series of case studies of recent 
restructurings and suggests, based on the higher than normal settlement amounts there, that the cause of 
those higher amounts might be the enhanced risk of holdout litigation.  Id.      12
sovereign market to date have all looked at the effects of one particular type of contract 
provision, CACs, on pricing.  Some of the studies find no pricing effects of CACs, 
whereas others do.  Among the issues with these studies is that they were all conducted 
prior to 2003 when the big shift toward CACs occurred in the U.S. market – these studies 
typically compare U.K. bonds with CACs to U.S. bonds without CACs
26  By contrast, 
because of the extensive and more recent dataset that we use, our study is able to examine 
the effects of using CACs within a single market, the U.S.  Further, the prior studies do 
not correct for variations in the types of clauses – that is variation in the phrasing of the 
clauses that might affect the legal risk.
27   Instead, for the most part, it was simply 
assumed that U.K. law governed bonds had CACs and U.S. law governed bonds did not – 
itself problematic since some U.S. bonds issued prior to 2003 did have CACs – and that 
all CACs and non-CACs were identical. The problem though is that the CACs and non-
CACs being examined in all of these studies likely had significant variation in phrasing 
that would have affected legal risk.
28  Our study endeavors to adjust for specific phrasing 
and its impact on litigation risk.  Consistent with research on corporate bonds, we find 
                                                     
26 See Liz Dixon & David Wall, Collective Action Problems and Collective Action Clauses, 9 Fin. Stability 
Rev. 142 (2000); Torbjorn Becker et al., Bond Restructuring and Moral Hazard: Are Collective Action 
Clauses Costly? 6 Int’l Fin. 415 (2003); Mark Gugiatti & Anthony Richards, Do Collective Action Clauses 
Influence Bond Yields? New Evidence from Emerging Markets (Discussion Paper, Reserve Bank of 
Australia, 2003); Barry Eichengreen & Ashoka Mody, Would Collective Action Clauses Raise Borrowing 
Costs? NBER Working Paper (2000); Barry Eichengreen & Ashoka Mody,  Would Collective Action 
Clauses Raise Borrowing Costs? An Update and Additional Results, Working Paper, University of 
California, Berkeley (2000). 
27 For more on the differential vulnerability to holdout creditor risk as a function of variations in the 
language of the clauses, see Stephen J. Choi & Mitu Gulati, Innovation in Boilerplate Contracts: An 
Empirical Examination of Sovereign Bonds, 53 Emory L. J. 929 (2004). 
28 Id.  Our study did not have to confront the problem of differing forms of CACs since the language of the 
CACs in our study were strikingly similar to one another with no material differences in their content.   13
that sovereign bond pricing is sensitive to changes in legal risk posed by particular type 
of bond covenants.
29 
 
II.  Empirical Design 
Evaluating whether market prices react to legal changes – such as court decisions or 
the passage of legislation – is typically difficult because it is rarely clear whether the final 
court decision or passage of legislation was anticipated and its likely effects incorporated 
into the price of the firm’s securities long before the legislation became official or the 
court decision  became public.  To correct for such problems, researchers typically 
estimate windows of time during which the legal event might have begun to be 
anticipated.
30   
Elliott, however, presents a unique natural experiment in which the court’s decision 
came as a complete shock to the market and was clearly  unanticipated.  The decision 
granting the injunction was made ex parte on the basis of submissions from the Elliott 
firm alone. Had Peru not settled the case so quickly, Peru’s lawyers would have been able 
to make their arguments before the court and a different result might have eventuated.  
But Peru’s heightened need to settle  – reportedly, a function of Alberto Fujimori’s 
                                                     
29 For example, a prior study by one of us finds that covenants in corporate bonds are priced by capital 
market participants.  See Michael Bradley & Michael R. Roberts, The Structure and Pricing of Corporate 
Debt Covenants  (draft dated May 13, 2004, available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=466240 ). 
30 See Sanjai Bhagat & Roberta Romano, Event Studies and the Law: Part I: Technique and Corporate 
Litigation, 4 Amer. L. Econ. Rev. 141 (2002).  With respect to judicial decisions, Bhagat and Romano note 
that  “judicial decisions are not clearly “events” except for the litigants . . . [because] other firms and 
investors will be able to contract around a rule and recalibrate costs and be nefits”.  However, in the instant 
case, Elliott did not resolve any issue that firms could subsequently contract around.  Rather the decision 
injected uncertainty in the pricing of sovereign debt.  Further, as discussed later, the data show that the 
lawyers found themselves unable to contract around the decision.   14
tenuous political position and resultant desire to avoid the publicity that a default on 
Peru’s Brady bonds might have brought – was also likely unanticipated.
31   
We think that it is plausible to assume that the filing of the government briefs in early 
2004 was largely unanticipated by the market.  We say this not only because the 
adversarial nature of the litigation process means that the substance of the briefs would be 
kept secret until the last moment, but also  because it was not clear what the U.S. 
government’s position was going to be.  Further, because in a prominent prior sovereign 
dispute, the U.S. had taken the position that New York courts should not interfere in 
contract interpretation matters, it was possible that the U.S. would be reluctant to say 
much of anything with respect to the contract interpretation issue.
32   The Belgian 
legislative decision, by contrast, was likely anticipated much before it happened  – the 
legislative process typically entails a good deal of negotiation and deliberation over many 
months, if not years. This was very much the case with the Belgian legislation
33.  As an 
approximation, therefore,  we assume that the markets knew about the impending 
legislation in early 2004. 
 
 
                                                     
31 See Robert Scott & Mitu Gulati, The Stickiness of Contract Terms: A Case Study (March 25 draft, on file 
with authors) (quoting leading practitioners on the quick and surprising settlement). 
32 See Jill E. Fisch & Caroline Gentile, Vultures of Vanguards: The Role of Litigation in Sovereign Debt 
Restructuring, 53 Emory L. J. 1043, 1079 (2004) (discussing the Allied Bank set of cases and the U.S. 
government’s position there).  Another factor complicating predictions of what the U.S. government’s 
position was likely to be was that Elliott’s principal, Paul Singer, was a major contributor to the Republican 
party.  So, the question was whether the Bush Administration’s Treasury Department would be willing to 
file a brief that went against the interests of Singer.  See Hedge Fund Chiefs, With Cash, Join Political 
Fray, New York Times, January 25, 2007.  
33 Our interviews suggest that this legislation took months rather than years.  Interviews with officials in 
Belgium for a sister project suggest that the Belgian legislature removed relative quickly, in contrast to 
many attempts at legislation that can take years, because of the importance of demonstrating to important 
institutions like Euroclear that Belgium was a friendly location for them and that Elliott was an aberration.  
See Scott & Gulati, supra note 31 (reporting on interviews with Belgian officials).      15
III.      Sample Description 
Our sample consists of 312 bonds issued by 40 countries over the period 1986 
through 2007. This is the full set of sovereign bond offerings available from the Thomson 
Financial database as of July 2007.  Thomson Financial is the most exhaustive collection 
of such documents.  We downloaded and read the prospectus for each of the bonds in the 
sample and extracted the relevant data by hand. Since the legal issues we examine arose 
under U.S. law, we limit our inquiry to the population of U.S. law issued bonds.
34  As an 
aside, the vast majority of all sovereign bonds are issued under either U.S. or U.K. law.  
German and Japanese law governed issuances comprise but slivers of the market. 
Table 1 reports the frequency of issues per year.  Also reported in Table 1 are the 
number and percentage of the bonds in the sample that are shelf-registrations
35 and the 
number and percentage of the bonds that contain a collective action clause. We separate 
shelf-registrations from other types of offerings because of the possibility that these 
offerings entail unique risks to investors.
36 The frequencies reported in Table 1 indicate 
                                                     
34 U.S. law effectively means the law of the state of New York, since that is the state law that al l of the 
bonds in our sample chose. 
35  Shelf registration is authorized by SEC rule 415, 17 C.F.R. § 230.415, and essentially permits issuers to 
separate the sometimes lengthy process of complying with the SEC registration requirements for public 
offerings from the actual sale of the registered securities. This permits issuers to registered the security 
weeks and sometimes months in advance of their actual sale. Once the formal registration steps are 
complied with and the registration statement is effective, the issuer then places the securities “on the shelf” 
to await market events that allow it to reduce interest rates by discretely catching market windows. See 
generally James D. Cox, Robert W. Hillman & Donald C. Langevoort, Securities Regulations Cases a nd 
Materials 196-204 (5
th ed. 2006).  Because speed is the essence of catching market windows, shelf offerings 
customarily entail competing bids from underwriters so that there is much less time for underwriters and 
their counsel to perform due diligence in connection with the offerings. This feature, as well as the signal 
imbedded in the shelf offering procedure is that issuers will act oportunisitcally to catch market windows, 
each contribute to a good deal of investor malaise regarding the offerings. See Denis, Shelf Registration 
and the Market for Seasoned Equity Offerings, 64 J. Bus. 189, 190-195 (1991)(few for-profit issuers 
engage in equity shelf offerings because the offerings incur substantial discounts for fear shares will be sold 
only when management believes they are overpriced in the market). 
36 At one level, there is the fear that because shelf offerings can occur more rapidly there is less time for the 
underwriters to engage in meaningful due diligence so as to assure that the offering documents do not 
contain a material misrepresentation. On another level, there is the suspicion that shelf offerings signal the 
offered security is believed to be over-priced. The latter arises because the very purpose of the shelf   16
that the sovereign bond market was thin prior to 1993.  However, 13 new issues were 
brought to market in 1996 and the average number of new issues was slightly over 25 per 
year between 1996 and 2006. 
The expansion in the sovereign bond market roughly corresponds to the period 
when the restructurings of sovereign loans from the prior two decades were being 
concluded.
37  The rationale for the shift from loans to bonds that is frequently given is 
that, after the losses the banks suffered in the 1980s, their enthusiasm for sovereign 
lending diminished.  The small number of outstanding bonds, however, had been largely 
immune from the restructurings of 1980s and early 1990s, which gave investors a level of 
confidence in bonds that loans did not carry.
38  There was also the matter of the 
innovation of Brady bonds – that were collateralized using U.S. Treasuries and provided 
banks with favorable accounting treatment – that may have helped add confidence and 
liquidity to the bond market that emerged full blown in the mid to late 1990s. 
        The data in Table 1 show that the percentage of sovereign debt issues that are 
shelf-registered has remained relatively  stable through time, averaging 68% per year 
between 1994 and 2007.  In contrast, the number of sovereign issues containing CACs 
was virtually zero until 2003.  However, 70% of all issues in 2003 contained a CAC, and 
this percentage increased to 92%  for the period 2004- 2007.  Figure 1 illustrates the 
composition of our sample.
39   
                                                                                                                                                            
offering is to facilitate the issuer catching favorable “market windows.”  It is the ability to act more 
opportunistically in the shelf registration context than in other types of offerings that subjects investors in 
securities offered pursuant to a shelf registration to a somewhat heightened risk of such opportunism. 
37 E.g., Ross P. Buckley, The Facilitation of the Brady Plan: Emerging Markets Debt Trading from 1989 to 
1993, 21 Fordham Int’l L. J. 1802 (1998); Turning Loans into Bonds: Lessons for East Asia from the Latin 
American Brady Plan, 1 J. Restructuring Fin. 185 (2004). 
38 E.g., Lee C. Buchheit, The Absence of Temptation, __ Latin Finance __ (forthcoming 2008). 
39 Since there are only five observations dating back to 1986, the figure reports the data only from 1992 
onward, although all of the statistical tests are performed on the entire sample.   17
The data reported in Table 1 and illustrated in Figure 1 indicate that the bulk of the 
sample observations are after 1998.  The number of observation per year is more than 
double after 1998, relative to the yearly rate prior to 1998.  Thus, the statistical tests 
presented below are heavily weighted toward the 1999-2006 period.  This skewing 
reflects the growth in the sovereign (and particularly emerging market) debt in recent 
years. 
 
IV.      Empirical Results 
  Table 2 reports the results of our regression analysis of the spread on sovereign 
debt as a function of (1) the bond’s rating; (2) the log of the size of the issue (amount); 
(3) its registration type (shelf or 144A); (4) whether the bond contains a CAC; and (5) the 
issue date.  For each bond in the sample, we calculate the difference between the yield-to-
maturity of the bond at its issue date and the yield-to-maturity of a U.S. Treasury bond 
with the closest time to maturity.  We define this difference as the bond’s spread.  The 
vector of bond spreads is the dependent variable in all of the regressions reported in 
Table 2.    
  The results of the first regression (“R1”) in Table 2 indicate that, as would be 
expected, the spreads on sovereign debt are significantly negatively related to the bond’s 
S&P rating: the coefficients are monotonically related to ratings – the higher the rating 
the lower the spread; the coefficients are “centered” around the omitted rating (BBB); 
and 3 of the 4 ratings’ dummy variables are highly significant, with t-Statistics of 5.0 or 
greater.     18
The results of R(1) also indicate that spreads are negatively related to the size of 
the issue.  This is a curious finding.  If there were a downward sloping demand curve for 
the bonds of a particular sovereignty, then one would expect a positive relation between 
spreads and amount.  The more debt that is issued, the lower the price (the higher the 
required rate of return), and hence the greater will be the spread over U.S. Treasuries.  On 
the other hand, a larger issue may create a more liquid market for the country’s debt, 
which would reduce its spread.  In addition, there may be an element of the “too big to 
fail” phenomenon at play.  The Official Sector, fearing contagion, may be more likely to 
step in to protect against defaults in the case of the largest issuers.    
The data reveal that shelf-registered issues command a higher spread than non-
shelf issues. This is another interesting finding since one of the presumed benefits of 
shelf registration is that issuers can “time” the market, which means that they can pre-
register a new issue, “put the registered bonds on the shelf,” and issue them when the 
firm, here a country, believes it to be propitious to do so.  One explanation suggested by 
the Finance literature is that market participants anticipate this incentive, and respond to 
this adverse selection by price-protecting themselves against the asymmetry of 
information between them and the ministries of finance in the issuing country.
40  Thus, 
they will price the bonds lower (generating a higher spread) when the country issues debt 
by means of a shelf registration.  Finally, it may be that the quality of diligence in shelf 
offerings – because of the speed with which these offerings are taken to the market – is 
                                                     
40  See S.C. Myers & N.S. Majlup, Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions When Firms Have 
Information That Investors Do Not Have, 35 J. Fin. Econ. 99-122 (1994)(arguing that the asymmetric 
information between firms and investors accounts for the negative reaction of the market to the 
announcement of a new stock issuance).   19
lower than that for non-shelves and that the market is discounting shelf offerings for this 
reason.
41   
The results of  R(1) in Table 2 indicate that the presence of a CAC significantly 
reduces the spread on sovereign debt.  However, recall that prior to 2003, virtually no 
sovereign debt had such clauses, whereas after 2003 more than 90% did.  Thus, CAC 
may well be a proxy for the entire post-2003 period – a period in which spreads are lower 
than average.  This interpretation is consistent with the results reported in subsequent 
regressions  in which the sign of the coefficient on CAC becomes positive and 
insignificantly different from zero when we add dummy variables for the post-2003 
years.
42 
Before moving on it is important to pause and note that it has become common 
practice in the social science literature to adjust statistics derived from panel data for the 
fact that observations in the sample are not independent.
43  For example, our initial panel 
consists of 312 bonds issued by 40 countries.  Consequently, our sample consists of a 
number of bonds issued by the same country and clearly these are not independent 
observations.  As we discuss below, countries are loathed to change even the language of 
the covenants in their debt instruments from one issue to the next.  Moreover, there are 
certainly country-related risks that are not captured by the issue’s S&P rating.  There are 
two ways to deal with the covariances inherent in panel data: one is to entertain dummy 
                                                     
41 As demonstrated subsequently, after Elliott Associates, there were more changes in the private offerings 
than in the shelf deals, which provide mild support for this conjecture.  However, as we will see, there are 
so few changes overall, that one cannot make too much of these differences.  
42 Since only 75% of the bonds issued in 2003 had CACs, as compared to over 90% thereafter, we test for 
the cross-sectional effect of CACs in that year.  We find that there is no statistical relation between the 
presence of a CAC and bond spreads in that year.  While the spreads are predictably and consistently 
related to ratings, the coefficient on the CAC dummy variable is positive and insignificant.  This sample 
contains 21 issues with CACs and  9 without. 
43 See M. A. Peterson, Estimating Standard Errors in Finance Panel Data Sets:  Comparing Approaches, 
Kellogg Finance Dept. Working Paper No. 329 (2006).   20
variables for each of the countries and calculate so-called country fixed-effects; the other 
is to “cluster” the estimates of the standard errors by country, which takes into account 
the covariance between the issues of a particular country through time.  We do both. 
R(2) in Table 2 includes 40 industry dummy variables.  The first thing to note is 
that the adjusted R
2  increases from 0.45 to 0.55 with the inclusion of the country 
variables.  Clearly there are significant country-specific effects.  Note also that the 
positive coefficient on double A rated bonds (AA) and the negative coefficient on single-
B rated bonds are significant, even after controlling for country effects.  Importantly, the 
inclusion of country fixed-effects does not affect the signs or the statistical significance 
of the other independent variables in the model – Amount, Shelf and CAC.  Finally, R(3)  
in Table 2 reports the effects of clustering standard errors at the country level.  Note that 
this procedure does not affect the estimated coefficients – just their estimated standard 
errors.  As can be seen, clustering standard errors has little to no effect on the statistical 
significance of the independent variables reported under R(1). 
R(4) in Table 2 includes dummy variables for the relevant years 2001– 2007.  
Based on the two litigation events under study, we divide the years into two periods: 
2001-2003, which is the post Elliot but pre amicus brief period – the aftermath of the 
shock, and 2004-2007, which corresponds to the two potential antidotes to this shock: the 
widespread use of CACs; and the announced U.S. government position countering the 
Elliott decision. 
The pattern of the coefficients on the dummy variables in R(4) across these seven 
years is consistent with the predictions  of the holdout analysis.  All of the dummy 
variables for the years 2001–2003 are positive and two of the three are statistically   21
significant.  The average annual effect over this period is an increase of a statistically 
significant 63 basis points per year – see the results reported under R(7).   In contrast, all 
of the annual dummy variables for the years 2004-2007 are negative, and three of the four 
are statistically significant.  Moreover, as shown in R(7), the average annual effect over 
this period is a decrease in the mean spread by a statistically significant 78 basis points.  
Thus, overall, the data indicate that the spreads on sovereign debt were “abnormally” 
high in the 2001-2003 period and “abnormally” low in the 2004-2007 period. 
The results reported in R(5) show that the inclusion of country fixed-effects 
reduces the significance of the annual effects but does not affect their signs.  Moreover 
the averages for the two periods, reported in R(8) have the same signs as in R(7) and are 
both statistically significant.    
Table 3 reports the impact of the degree of vulnerability to the rateable payment 
interpretation on the spreads of sovereign debt issues.  As noted at the outset, Elliott 
represented a legal shock because it enhanced the likelihood of holdouts and the success 
of engaging in a holdout strategy so that opportunistic litigation and bargaining occurred 
in the shadow of the newly invigorated pari passu clause.  So viewed, differential price 
effects should exist across clauses that are worded  differently and therefore present 
different vulnerability to litigation.  The details of the variation in clauses in the market 
have been explored elsewhere, but broadly speaking there are three categories of clauses 
– those with high, medium and low vulnerability to litigation under the rateable payments 
interpretation.
44 
                                                     
44 See Scott & Gulati, supra note 31, and references there.    22
The categorization we use is drawn from the writings of the leading commentators 
on the topic.
45  The riskiest form of the clause provides “We will pay our debt obligations 
on a pro rata basis”.  Either that or words such as “and shall be paid as such” or “shall be 
discharged as such” will appear at the end of the standard clause providing for the 
ranking of debt claims.  Italy was among the sovereigns in our dataset using this type of 
clause. Language such as this can hardly be interpreted other than compelling equal 
treatment at the moment of payment.  At the opposite end of the spectrum is a clause that 
provides that the offered debt securities “will rank equally.”  Because the clause only 
refers to ranking (such as, equal rights in any alternation of the bond’s terms) and not the 
act of payment, it poses a lower order of risk that the clause could be the source of a 
substantial holdout claim. This form of the clause is widely used and appears in offerings 
for Belize, Grenada, China, Costa Rica, and Guatemala, among others.  Falling in 
between, in the middle risk category are clauses appearing in offerings by Mexico, 
Philippines, Turkey, Argentina, Chile, and Columbia, among others.  Their clauses’ 
language provided the debt shall “rank at least pari passu in priority of payment and in 
rank of security.” This is the language that was common before the Belgian court in 
Elliott and permitted Elliott’s expert to successfully argue that the works “rank” and 
“pay” were interchangeable so that the natural construction should be that bonds could 
only be paid rateably.  
The results of dividing the contracts in terms of their differential vulnerability to 
litigation enables us to go beyond the question of whether the market reacted broadly to 
Elliott; our three-way division of clauses allows discrete inquiry as to whether the 
                                                     
45 The two sources we utilize here are LEE BUCHHEIT, HOW TO NEGOTIATE EUROCURRENCY LOAN 
AGREEMENTS, 83 (2d ed. 2004) and the FMLC Report, supra note 19.   23
market’s reaction was dependent on the risk levels of the type of clause employed – a 
level of inquiry that has not previously been conducted with respect to bond contracts.   
We see from  R(1) in  Table 3 that there is an inverted U shaped effect of 
separating the risk categories.  The spreads on bonds with “high litigation vulnerability” 
(HLV) and “low litigation vulnerability” (LLV) are significantly lower than the spreads 
on bonds with “medium litigation vulnerability” (the omitted variable).  Note that these 
relations are significant while holding constant the bond’s rating, and in R(4) and R(5) its 
issue date.  However, note that these relations become insignificantly different from zero 
when country fixed-effects are added to the regression model – R(2), R(5) and R(8).  The 
insignificance of litigation vulnerability in these regressions indicates a strong country 
effect, which is not at all surprising since, as mentioned above,  we will show that 
countries are extremely reluctant to change the language in their bond covenants and 
therefore there is a high degree of correlation between countries and covenant language. 
Before moving on, note that the estimates of the average spread in the 2001-2003 period 
are all significantly positive, and the average spread in the 2004-2007 period are all 
negative and two of the three are statistically significant. 
  The data in Table 4 better illustrate the inverted U shape relation found in the 
data.  The table reports summary statistics of the spreads for each of the three categories 
of litigation vulnerability:  Low, Medium and High.  The test statistics indicate that the 
mean spread of the bonds in the Medium category is significantly larger than the mean 
spread of the bonds in the Low category ( t = 4.30 ) and larger than the mean spread of 
the bonds in the High category ( t = 7.22).    24
There are a couple of explanations why spreads for the medium-risk pari passu clause 
may have increased post-Elliott while the spreads for the high- and low- risk clauses did 
not. The existence of the inverted U shape in spreads with respect to litigation 
vulnerability is consistent with the commitment versus flexibility continuum that has 
been discussed in the literature.
46 Consistent with this view, we find that both the most 
risky and the least risky clauses produce positive value (lower spreads) in the eyes of 
investors. This occurs perhaps because, in the case of the high risk clause, the issuer is 
understood to commit that it will not fail because to do so will visit upon it extraordinary 
transaction costs arising from the greater power the clause confers on creditors wishing to 
act opportunistically as holdouts. And, in the case of the low risk clause, investors reacted 
positively as they understood this version of the pari passu contract poses the lowest 
likelihood of costly holdout litigation in the event of a financial restructuring.  In other 
words, the issuer has greater flexibility if it needs to enter into a restructuring.  
  An alternate explanation for the inverted U, and one that we find more plausible, 
reflects less faith in markets than the explanation above.  Recall that prior to Elliott the 
pari passu clause, while customary in sovereign debt offerings, was generally believed to 
have no impact on the riskiness of the offering. Our data show not only that Elliott 
changed this, but increased riskiness primarily with respect to the version of the pari 
passu clause that was interpreted in  Elliott  (the medium-risk version).  The uneven 
impact of Elliott may reflect the fact that markets did not extend Elliott’s implications 
beyond the medium-risk clause, viewing the decision, incorrectly in our eyes, as being 
limited to the particular formulation before the court in Elliott. Markets therefore did not 
                                                     
46 See Ashoka Mody, What is an Emerging Market? IMF Working Paper No. WP/04/177 (available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=879002).   25
extrapolate from Elliott how its holding might impact other forms of the pari passu 
clause.  This result is all the more understandable if one believes, as was the popular 
perception within the market, that Elliott was both aberrational and sui generis.  Our data, 
however, do not allow us to go beyond speculating as to possible explanations for the 
inverted U. 
There is a puzzle here, however.  When counsel for the countries that had clauses in 
the medium risk category saw that there was a pricing benefit to moving to a different 
clause, either high risk or low risk, they should have done so.  Further, even if counsel 
did not believe that there was a pricing benefit to moving to a different type of clause, 
there was still the option of doing something to reduce the risk of the rateable payments 
interpretation.  Our empirical results show that there was a pricing penalty overall that, 
we conjecture, resulted from the enhanced risk of potential holdouts based on Elliott.  
Conceivably that penalty could have been eliminated, especially for clauses in the middle 
risk range, by deleting the clause or at least dropping a footnote explaining that whatever 
their clause meant,  it did not mean what Elliott said it did.  Yet, Table 5 reveals that 
instead of drafting new language in the wake of Elliott, counsel for both the sovereigns 
and the underwriters ignored the decision: they did nothing.
47  Instead, they waited three 
years, until 2004, when the Official Sector stepped in to try and provide an antidote.  The 
data in Table 5 are reported for three separate time periods: (1) 1986 – 2000 (pre Elliott); 
(2) 2001-2003 (post Elliott; but prior to the filing of the amicus briefs); and (3) 2004-
2007 (post amicus briefs).  For each country in our database, we read the pari passu 
clauses in successive offerings and noted whether the language changed from the 
                                                     
47 Subsequently we discuss the various actions that lawyers could have (should have) taken in the wake of 
Elliott.   26
previous issue. We hypothesize that changes would occur more frequently in registered 
public offerings than in private offerings because the former has greater liability for the 
sovereign issuer and its underwriters than the latter. 
The overall story implied by the results reported in Table 5 is that there were very few 
changes in language made at all – as a general matter, the clauses hardly change.  But the 
number of changes made, if anything, dropped after  Elliott, instead of dramatically 
increasing.  Put differently, instead of being galvanized into innovating and reforming 
their contracts as a result of  Elliott, the lawyers appear to have  become more 
conservative; in effect, they froze. As an aside, there are more changes to the clauses that 
are made in the private offerings than in the public shelf deals.  But the differences are 
not big enough to make too much of them here.  
As noted, we are puzzled as to why lawyers for sovereigns did not attempt to avoid 
the resulting rise in their clients’ costs of capital by the simple expedient of either 
removing the  pari passu  clause from post-Elliott offerings (a course that appears 
relatively free of problems given the questionable role the clause would ever play since 
sovereigns do not liquidate) or employing language for pari passu clause that is less 
problematic.  
 As a check on the robustness of our empirical tests, we examine the pattern of 
bond ratings over the three relevant time periods.  The point of this exercise is to show 
that our results are not being driven by changes in the distribution of bond ratings over 
time.  Table 6 reports the distribution of the sample according S&P bond ratings. The 
data show that the distribution of the ratings of sovereign bonds has remained relatively   27
constant over the 22-years under study and virtually constant over the 2001 to 2007 
period. 
                                          Delete and delete Table 7 
The final independent variable that we examine regarding the covariates with 
spreads is the identity of the legal advisors involved in the offering.  Although there are 
approximately two dozen large U.S. firms who do sovereign debt work, a handful have 
specific expertise in the area.  Presumably, these firms are better to both protect against 
and tackle the problems posed by holdouts.  Prior research, for example, showed that 
being represented by one of the lead firms correlated with whether an issuer adopted 
CACs.
48  To evaluate the possibility that using one of these expert firms reduces spreads, 
we include a dummy variable into our full model that is equal to one if the leading 
underwriter’s counsel is Sullivan & Cromwell and a separate dummy variable equal to 
one if Cleary Gottlieb, is involved in the issuance.  Our results, reported in Table 7,  
provide some support for the expert lawyer hypothesis in that the coefficients on both 
Sullivan & Cromwell and Cleary Gottlieb are negative (spread reducing).  However, only 
the coefficient on Sullivan & Cromwell is statistically significant (at the 7% level). 
 
V.    Conclusion 
Our analysis suggests that market prices adjust to unanticipated judicial events.  
We conjecture that the 2000 Belgian decision was a shock to the market and injected a 
new source of uncertainty into the pricing of these these securities.  We find empirical 
support for this conjecture.  The mean spread on sovereign debt is significantly higher 
                                                     
48 See Stephen J. Choi & Mitu Gulati, Innovation in Boilerplate Contracts: An Empirical Examination of 
Sovereign Bonds, 53 Emory L. J. 929 (2004),     28
than the average over the preceding nine years in the three years following the 2000 
Belgian decision, including in 2003, the year when CACs began to be adopted by the 
sovereigns.  We also find that spreads are significantly lower than the historical average 
in the four years following the filing of amicus briefs by the U.S. Treasury and the 
Federal Reserve calling for a New York court to reject the Belgian decision.  In the same 
year, the Belgian government passed legislation that made it much harder for a creditor to 
hold out and exploit the benefit of its position in a Belgian court as did Elliott.   
  Our empirical results indicate that the judicial injection of uncertainty into the 
meaning of crucial contract terms is priced by capital market participants in a predictable 
fashion.  Decisions that increase the risk of repayment by sovereigns increase the rate of 
return sovereigns must pay in order to attract international capital. Decisions, such as the 
position announced by the U.S. government in its 2004 amici briefs, that reduce this risk, 
reduce the cost of capital that sovereigns face.  
A possibility that bears explication is that the spread-increasing effects that we 
observe in the 2001-2003 period may not be a function solely of the Elliott, but a function 
of the market’s recognition that there had been a change in sovereign debt markets 
generally with hedge funds beginning to pursue aggressive litigation and other strategies 
being undertaken for the purpose of disrupting restructurings.  In other words, Elliott 
might have been more a symptom of a change rather than the change itself.
49  Countering 
this possibility is that we find a significant spread-decreasing effect corresponding to the 
moves taken by the Official Sector to counter specifically the rateable payments 
                                                     
49 In the 2001-2003 period, Elliott was followed by assertions of the rateable payments argument in three 
other cases, against the Congo, Nicaragua and Argentina.  It was in the third of those cases, against, 
Argentina, that the U.S. government and the N.Y. Fed stepped in to give their views as amicus curiae.  See 
Scott & Gulati, supra note 31.     29
interpretation.  Further, we do not find spread-reducing effects from the use of CACs, 
which were designed to counter the broader holdout problem but would have had but a 
limited utility against the rateable payment argument.
50      
The foregoing story challenges the dominant narrative in the sovereign debt 
literature, which has been to link the holdout problem to the solution of CACs.  Our 
evidence suggests that the holdout problem was linked more directly to the pari passu 
litigation and, perhaps unsurprisingly in hindsight, the most effective solutions to it were 
litigation based: the filing of amicus briefs and the passage of legislation that increased 
the difficulty of litigating.  In contrast, the CAC contractual solution aimed at some 
broader and more general holdout problem appears to have had little  effect, at least 
within the time frame we examine here.
51  It is possible that the utility of this contractual 
solution will become more evident in the future, especially as the stock of old bonds 
without CACs diminishes (currently, only new issues contain CACs).  But for now, the 
market appears to attach little positive value to the use of CACs. 
    We conclude with  a  conundrum: i f the ambiguities arising from the  Elliott 
decision caused an increase in the cost of sovereign debt, then why were the clauses not 
modified, clarified, or simply removed from future offerings more widely?  Why did the 
Official Sector have to step in to provide a solution to a basic contract reform problem?   
                                                     
50 In theory CACs could be used up front in a restructuring to protect against the holdout problem by 
simply obtaining the necessary voting threshold to reduce the amount owed by the debtor.  However, if that 
threshold was not obtained (and a 75% vote is not easy to obtain, especially i f the holdouts obtain a 
sizeable position), the rateable payments could come into play. 
51 The foregoing is not altogether surprising, when one sees that CACs work only within a single bond 
issue.  That is, a sovereign might have bonds with CACs and bonds requiring unanimous approval.  In such 
a case, the CACs would help only to ameliorate the holdout problem with the bond that contained them.  
And to the extent the sovereign was not willing to treat the CAC bondholders differently than the others, 
the CACs would be useless (at least until the sovereign had retired all its non CAC bonds).  The anti-
litigation strategies, by contrast, directly attacked the problem and potentially solved it.   30
Table 1 
Total Issuances of Sovereign Debt, the Number and Percentage of Shelf Registered 
and the Number and Percentage of Issues Containing a Collective Action Clause 
 
                Shelf                  CAC
Year Total Number Percentage Number Percentage
1986 3 0 0
1987 0 0 0
1988 0 0 0
1989 1 0 0
1990 1 0 0
1991 0 0 0
1992 1 0 0
1993 3 1 33% 0
1994 8 5 63% 0
1995 4 2 50% 0
1996 13 8 62% 0
1997 17 9 53% 1 6%
1998 15 10 67% 0
1999 22 17 77% 1 5%
2000 29 19 66% 2 7%
2001 33 22 67% 3 9%
2002 31 19 61% 0
2003 33 23 70% 23 70%
2004 32 26 81% 28 88%
2005 33 25 76% 31 94%
2006 20 18 90% 19 95%
2007 11 7 64% 10 91%  31
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Table 2 
Dependent Variable:  Spreads on Sovereign Debt Relative to U.S. Treasury Bonds 
(t-Statistics in parentheses, ***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10) 
 
                         INDEPENDENT VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
CONSTANT 3.33*** 3.09 3.33*** 3.43*** 2.28 3.43*** 3.41*** 2.13 3.41***
(5.04) (1.63) (6.14) (5.31) (1.23) (5.33) (5.34) (1.15) (6.11)
BOND RATING: AA -2.52*** -2.16 -2.52*** -2.71*** -3.60** -2.71*** -2.65*** -2.66* -2.65***
(-5.19) (-1.44) (-8.53) (-5.74) (-2.36) (-8.00) (-5.69) (-1.81) (-8.60)
A -0.61 -0.64 -0.61 -0.97** -0.83 -0.97** -0.97** -0.85 -0.97*
(-1.39) (-0.61) (-1.26) (-2.24) (-0.81) (-2.09) (-2.33) (-0.83) (-1.94)
BB 1.49*** 0.24 1.49*** 1.44*** 0.58 1.44*** 1.44*** 0.48 1.44***
(4.96) (0.58) (4.57) (4.93) (1.40) (4.60) (5.00) (1.21) (4.65)
B 2.37*** 1.35*** 2.37*** 2.33*** 1.46*** 2.33*** 2.29*** 1.35*** 2.29***
(7.08) (3.18) (5.17) (7.17) (3.47) (5.35) (7.14) (3.27) (5.21)
AMOUNT -0.58** -0.68*** -0.58** -0.73*** -0.79*** -0.73*** -0.71*** -0.80*** -0.71***
(-2.39) (-2.71) (-2.66) (-3.10) (-3.22) (-3.05) (-3.05) (-3.26) (-3.34)
SHELF 0.90*** 1.27*** 0.90*** 1.13*** 1.21*** 1.13*** 1.08*** 1.19*** 1.08***
(3.76) (3.16) (2.77) (4.77) (2.84) (3.75) (4.60) (2.78) (3.46)
CAC -0.67*** -0.97*** -0.67** 0.17 -0.29 0.17
(-3.09) (-4.14) (-2.43) (0.45) (-0.57) (0.39)
TIME PERIODS: 2001 0.64** 0.54 0.64*
(1.98) (1.55) (1.72)
2002 0.70** 0.58 0.70*
(2.00) (1.51) (1.96)
2003 0.42 0.58 0.42
(1.05) (1.16) (0.88)
2001-2003 0.63*** 0.47* 0.63*
(2.61) (1.69) (1.97)
2004 -0.55 -0.26 -0.55
(-1.17) (-0.43) (-0.96)
2005 -0.90* -0.46 -0.90
(-1.89) (-0.76) (-1.57)
2006 -1.41*** -1.25* -1.41**
(-2.61) (-1.89) (-2.25)
2007 -1.76** -1.69** -1.76***
(-2.29) (-1.99) (-3.05)
2004-2007 -0.78*** -0.90*** -0.78**
(-3.12) (-3.14) (-2.06)
Country Fixed Effects No Yes No No Yes No No Yes No
Clustered Standard Errors No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes
Adj. R
2 0.45 0.55 0.45 0.50 0.58 0.50 0.50 0.66 0.50
Observations 252 252 252 252 252 252 252 253 252    33
Table 3 
Dependent Variable:  Sovereign Debt Relative to U.S. Treasury Bonds 
 (t-Statistics in parentheses, ***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10) 
 
                         INDEPENDENT VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
CONSTANT 2.54*** 1.32 2.54*** 2.50*** 0.59 2.50*** 2.51*** 0.42 2.51***
(8.84) (0.70) (7.06) (8.40) (0.33) (6.09) (8.51) (0.24) (6.32)
BOND RATING: AA -2.09*** -2.35 -2.09*** -2.16*** -3.43** -2.16*** -2.14*** -2.71* -2.14***
(-3.74) (-1.50) (-6.93) (-3.95) (-2.21) (-5.74) (-3.97) (-1.80) (-6.75)
A -0.72* -1.40 -0.72 -0.75* -1.13 -0.75 -0.78* -1.10 -0.78
(-1.67) (-1.30) (-1.50) (-1.76) (-1.09) (-1.55) (-1.85) (-1.06) (-1.65)
BB 1.34*** 0.56 1.34*** 1.37*** 0.68 1.37*** 1.36*** 0.64 1.36***
(4.43) (1.35) (3.55) (4.63) (1.62) (3.66) (4.66) (1.59) (3.69)
B 2.12*** 1.29*** 2.12*** 2.20*** 1.42*** 2.20*** 2.15*** 1.31*** 2.15***
(6.18) (2.92) (4.15) (6.50) (3.30) (4.54) (6.43) (3.11) (4.54)
HLV -0.96** 0.76 -0.96*** -0.98*** 0.42 -0.98*** -0.99*** 0.30 -0.99***
(-2.59) (0.88) (-4.11) (-2.72) (0.50) (-4.19) (-2.78) (0.36) (-4.22)
LLV -0.52** -0.17 -0.52* -0.63** -0.17 -0.63** -0.61** -0.25 -0.61**
(-2.06) (-0.35) (-1.93) (-2.54) (-0.34) (-2.22) (-2.48) (-0.51) (-2.20)
TIME PERIODS: 2001 0.70** 0.62* 0.70
(2.11) (1.81) (1.61)
2002 0.72** 0.73** 0.72*
(2.04) (1.98) (1.84)
2003 0.50 0.45 0.50
(1.43) (1.23) (1.21)
2001-2003 0.64*** 0.59** 0.64*
(2.63) (2.19) (1.80)
2004 -0.35 -0.29 -0.35
(-1.03) (-0.81) (-0.65)
2005 -0.35 -0.30 -0.35
(-1.00) (-0.79) (-0.85)
2006 -0.97** -1.11*** -0.97**
(-2.35) (-2.70) (-2.46)
2007 -0.87 -1.30** -0.87**
(-1.47) (-2.14) (-2.09)
2004-2007 -0.53** -0.59** -0.53
(-2.16) (-2.23) (-1.51)
Country Fixed Effects No Yes No No Yes No No Yes No
Clustered Standard Errors No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes
ADJ - R
2 0.42 0.51 0.42 0.46 0.54 0.46 0.47 0.63 0.47
OBSERVATIONS 259 260 259 259 260 259 259 260 259    34
 
 
Table 4 
Spreads on Sovereign Debt Relative to U.S. Treasury Bonds  
According to Litigation Vulnerability 
 
STATISTIC LOW MED HIGH MED-LOW MED-HIGH
Mean 2.83% 3.87% 1.08% 1.04% 2.80%
Std.Dev. 1.47% 1.95% 2.30% 0.24% 0.39%
Number 64 157 42 N/A N/A
t-Statistic 15.38 24.86 3.03 4.30 7.22  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5 
Frequency of Changes in the Language of Pari Passu Clauses in Sovereign Debt 
 
       1986 - 2000        2001 - 2003         2004 - 2007             Overall
Shelf 144A Shelf 144A Shelf 144A Shelf 144A
Bonds 73 20 61 27 77 19 211 66
Language Changes 10 9 4 7 3 4 17 20
Percentage  14% 45% 7% 26% 4% 21% 8% 30%  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   35
Table 6 
Distribution of S&P Ratings on Sovereign Debt through Time 
 
Rating             Total Sample        1986-2000        2001-2003        2004-2007
AAA 3 3
AA  21 9 8 4
AA- 2 2
23 7.59% 9 7.96% 8 8.33% 6 6.38%
A+ 4 2 2
A 4 1 3
A- 21 3 11 7
29 9.57% 6 5.31% 11 11.46% 12 12.77%
BBB+ 7 3 1 3
BBB 15 5 6 4
BBB- 24 17 5 2
46 15.18% 25 22.12% 12 12.50% 9 9.57%
BB+ 40 17 20 3
BB 61 31 10 19
BB- 32 6 10 16
133 43.89% 54 47.79% 40 41.67% 38 40.43%
B+ 22 11 7 4
B 35 4 9 22
B- 15 4 9 3
72 23.76% 19 16.81% 25 26.04% 29 30.85%
Totals 303 113 96 94    36
Table 7 
 
Dependent Variable:  Spreads on Sovereign Debt Relative to U.S. Treasury Bonds 
 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES MODEL 1 MODEL 2
CONSTANT 0.034 0.033
(5.34) (5.05)
BOND RATING: AA -0.027 -0.028
(5.69) (5.70)
A -0.010 -0.011
(2.33) (2.54)
BB 0.014 0.015
(5.00) (5.13)
B 0.023 0.024
(7.14) (7.19)
AMOUNT -0.007 -0.007
(3.05) (2.86)
SHELF 0.011 0.012
(4.60) (4.74)
2001-2003 0.006 0.006
(2.61) (2.39)
2004-2007 -0.008 -0.008
(3.12) (2.96)
S&C -0.004
(1.72)
Cleary 0.000
(0.11)
ADJ - R
2
51.48 50.08
OBSERVATIONS 252 252  
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